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Abstract  
 
This article aims to evaluate the relative importance of the industry-specific factors and the size-
specific factors in relation to their impact on the corporate capital structure in certain countries of 
the European Union. The first, theoretical part of the study provides a literature review on the 
industry  and  the  size  as  capital  structure  determinants.  The  following  empirical  research 
includes 9 EU countries,  where the  importance of the two factors is compared both for the 
aggregated data, as well as in individual countries separately. The source of the data is the 
BACH-ESD database. The applied methodology involves the analysis of variance and cluster 
analysis. The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, it prioritizes the two factors in question, 
whereas most of the hitherto studies only identify the significance of various determinants of 
leverage. The second contribution is that this study is based on non-public firms – unlike the 
majority of studies which verify the capital structure theories using mainly samples of large listed 
companies. 
 
Keywords: Capital Structure Determinants, Industry Effect, Size Effect, Cluster Analysis, EU 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The literature on the determinants of capital structure – both theoretical and empirical – though 
abundant,  often  remains  inconclusive  in  terms  of  the  relative  importance  of  various  factors 
affecting corporate financial leverage. Both the industrial influences and the size effect have 
been  subject  to  multiple  studies  aiming  to  verify  various  theories  of  capital  structure.  The 
available research results do not provide inference about the relative importance of the two 
factors considered. Most  of the empirical research is only  limited to  the identification  of the 
significance of a given factor, possibly in combination with the direction of its impact on financial 
leverage. However, most of the studies in this area made no attempt to prioritize the analyzed 
factors of capital structure according to the strength of their impact on the level of corporate 
debt. Even in the case of studies where the authors initially declare to establish the hierarchy of 
some factors (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2009; Pathak, 2010), the results usually come down only to 
determining  the  statistical  significance  of  variables  and  their  importance  in  affecting  capital 
structure.  
It is relevant to contrast the relative importance of the capital structure determinants 
primarily  from  the  point  to  view  of  corporate  financial  risk.  It  has  been  widely  reported  by 
literature, starting from the earliest theories (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), that corporate financial 
risk is directly affected by capital structure adopted by a firm. The larger the portion of debt in 
the financial structure, the more a company is exposed to insolvency and even bankruptcy risk  
 
 
J. Koralun-Bereznicka / Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, 1(2), 2013, 1-27 
 
 
 
2 
 
(Altman, 1993; 2001). Therefore, learning whether the capital structure depends more on the 
firm size or its industrial membership, enriches our understanding of the factors affecting risk, 
which itself constitutes one of the most important decision-making criteria. Consequently, the 
evaluation  of  the  relative  importance  of  the  two  factors may  be  significant  in  the  context  of 
investment diversification. If these are mainly industry factors which are responsible for capital 
structure,  investment  portfolios  management  strategies  should  be  based  mainly  on  cross-
industry sections. However, the strategy of portfolio diversification by firm sizes would be more 
justified in the case of the size effect domination. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Industry Specificity as the Capital Structure Determinant  
 
The first factor considered in detail in this paper is the business sector (industry). Even very 
early  empirical  studies  of  the  capital  structure  show  similarities  in  the  debt  ratio  between 
enterprises belonging to the same industry and the diversification of financial leverage of firms 
operating  in  different  economic  sectors  (Schwartz  and  Aronson,  1967;  Scott,  1972).  This 
suggests that the average debt-equity rate for the industry sets a kind of a target ratio pursued 
by the companies from the economic sector. This hypothesis was partially verified by Taggart 
(1977)  and  Marsh  (1982),  who  found  that  managers  of  companies  belonging  to  the  same 
industry try to maintain the capital structure at the average industrial level, provided that there 
are favorable conditions in the capital market, such as stable and relatively low interest rate for 
loans, the ease of obtaining debt by issuing corporate bonds and investors’ expectations about 
the stability of the share prices growth. It can thus be concluded that this average industrial 
standard of the debt to equity ratio can provide an estimate of the target and the optimal capital 
structure of a company in the industry. This generalization is confirmed e.g. by Bowen et al. 
(1982), who showed that the average industrial leverage ratio is stable in the long run, and the 
value of this ratio for most companies in this sector (about 80%) fluctuates around this mean 
value. The hypothesis concerning the capital structure of enterprises adapting to the industry 
mean was again positively verified by Bradley et al. (1984) and Fischer et al. (1989) in their 
empirical studies.  
There are several reasons to assume that the sector in which a company operates has 
a significant impact on its capital structure (Prasad et al. 2001). One of the arguments proposed 
by Titman (1984) is based on the assumption that a company seeks to maximize its liquidation 
value. It is argued that if  the probability of firm liquidation  increases, it reduces the present 
stream of cash flow. According to the author, this effect is due to the fact that in the case of 
company liquidation, the after-sales service also disappears. Thus, consumers are less likely to 
buy durable goods in the company at risk, due to the expected increases in the maintenance 
costs  of  the  product.  The  more  specialized  the  product,  the  lower  liquidation  value  of  the 
company, because it is more difficult to replace the after-sales service. This in turn suggests the 
existence of differences in leverage between the different industries, as companies producing 
more specialized products tend to have such a level of leverage, which would allow them to 
compensate for the lower liquidation value. 
Most of the literature examining the relationship between the industrial classification and 
the leverage strongly supports the idea that companies located in different industries also differ 
in terms of debt. For example, Harris and Raviv (1991) reported that service companies have 
higher  leverage  than  manufacturing  firms.  However,  identifying  the  differences  in  capital 
structure across industries does not yet explain them, as there is no clear relationship between 
the industrial classification and the degree of specialization of the final product. 
According to the model by De Angelo and Masulis (1980), the optimal capital structure 
is  determined  by  sectoral  factors  partly  because  tax  rates  vary  across  industries  (Siegfried, 
1984; Rosenberg, 1969). Billingsley et al. (1994) also demonstrated that companies which use 
both equity and debt to finance their activity, in order to better align their capital structure to the 
industrial average should be perceived better by the capital market. Such companies generate 
higher returns for the investors than firms using only equity or only debt in the same industry.   
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However, as opposed to Masulis (1983), who claims that the market reaction is more 
favorable for companies issuing debt in order to move closer to the industrial mean than for 
firms  departing  from  this  standard  value,  Hatfield  et  al.  (1994)  show  that  the  relationship 
between  the  level  of  corporate  debt  and  industry  debt  is  irrelevant  to  the  perception  of  a 
company by the market. 
Despite extensive research on financial structure made after a detailed review of the 
literature carried out by Myers (1984) and Harris and Raviv (1991), a number of questions about 
the relationship between the sector of activity and financial decisions of companies remain open 
(Phillips and MacKay, 2005). Although the influence of sectoral factors on capital structure is a 
widely accepted view, empirical studies show significant variation of that structure, even in the 
case of controlling for the industry specificity (Bradley et al. 1984, Remmers et al. 1974). 
Early  theories  about  the  relationship  between  financial  and  product  markets  refer  to 
similar companies in highly concentrated industries, so they do not explain the reasons why 
competitive  enterprises  choose  different  capital  structure  (Brander  and  Lewis,  1986; 
Maksimovic, 1988). Some more recent theory, in turn, examines the market competitiveness of 
products  in  the  event  that  the  companies  are  characterized  by  different  financial  structures 
(Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Rotemberg and Scharfstein, 1990). None of these approaches, 
however, explains the reasons for variation of corporate financial parameters within the sector. 
Even later studies conducted by Maksimovic and Zechner (1991), Williams (1995) or 
Fries et  al. (1997) show how both material  and financial decisions are  taken in competitive 
industries. The interrelationship between these two categories of decision-making is also the 
key feature of many partial equilibrium models, which show the relationship between flexibility of 
assets and financial structure (Mauer and Triantis, 1994; Dammon and Senbet, 1998; Leland 
1998; MacKay, 2003). Businesses make decisions about their assets and liabilities taking into 
account decisions in this area taken by other companies in the sector, which results in more 
diversified financial structures within the sector, rather than the target debt ratio common for the 
entire industry. As evidenced by Almazan and Molina (2004) in a study of intra-industry diversity 
of capital structure, it is greater in sectors with high concentration, freer practices of corporate 
governance  and  greater  assets  flexibility.  Their  study  also  showed  a  greater  diversity  of 
financing in industries where firms use different production technologies, in older industries and 
in sectors with better development opportunities. These results confirm the importance of the 
agency  theory  of  capital  structure  and  suggest  that  flexibility  is  a  crucial  factor  in  terms  of 
corporate financing policy. 
MacKay and Phillips (2002) also contribute the discussion about the existence of an 
optimal capital structure for industry. Their research shows that industrial factors explain the 
financial structure of enterprises, the diversification of companies within the sector, as well as 
the  interdependence  of  material  and  financial  decisions.  Although  the  authors  prove  the 
absence of an optimal financial structure of an industry, they claim that deviations from the 
average in this area are related to the choice of technology and the risk level in the industry. 
Thus, if a company’s financial structure differs from the industrial average, usually it also means 
differences in terms of technology and risk.  
Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) assume that firms choose between the so-called safe 
technology with certain marginal costs and risky technology, with uncertain costs. In a partial 
equilibrium the debt is not issued, because the owners prefer the risky technology, which initially 
offers  a  higher  expected  rate  of  return.  As  more  and  more  companies  choose  the  risky 
technology, it becomes less risky, but also less profitable. The equilibrium is achieved when the 
expected values of both technologies are even, and firms no longer vary in terms of debt and 
risk level. Thus, as the authors show, in the equilibrium conditions in an industry, the financial 
structure is irrelevant, as the risks associated with the adopted technology and the profitability 
are dependent not only on the firm’s specificity, but also on how many companies apply this 
technology. First, their analysis indicates that companies which use the technology close to the 
industry median benefit from the natural risk reduction. Such companies will use less leverage 
than companies whose technology is very different from the industry norm. Second, to maintain 
the equilibrium, firms within the sector adopt appropriate measures to compensate for the risk 
arising from the level of debt and the technology.  
 
 
J. Koralun-Bereznicka / Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, 1(2), 2013, 1-27 
 
 
 
4 
 
Williams (1995) modified the above described model by introducing the endogenous 
variables in the form of entry and exit from the market, as well as exogenous consumption of 
salary bonuses. The author assumes that firms in an industry produce a homogenous product 
with the use of labor-intensive technologies with high variable costs, but not requiring capital 
expenditures,  or  with  the  use  of  capital-intensive  technologies  with  low  variable  costs,  and 
requiring funding from the capital market. Although the capital market is perfectly competitive, 
capital is rationed, which is associated with the consumption of salary bonuses by managers. 
Even  if  there  are  no  entry  costs,  most  capital-intensive  companies  generate  capital  gains, 
because due to the occurrence of the problem of managerial agency, the few companies using 
labor-intensive  technology  do  not  raise  capital  from  the  market,  which  allows  the  capital-
intensive firms to maintain monopoly rent. William’s model, therefore, by allowing operators to 
enter the market, suggests asymmetrical equilibrium within an industry, in which the core is 
made  of  large,  stable  companies  using  leverage  and  capital-intensive  technologies.  The 
periphery  of  the  industry  market  is  composed  of  smaller,  more  risky  and  less  profitable 
companies which use labor-intensive technology.  
In turn, the model developed by Fries et al. (1997) shows that as a consequence of the 
trade-off  between  tax  benefits  and  agency  costs,  firms  optimize  their  capital  structure  by 
increasing  their  debt  after  entering  the  sector.  This  model  combines  some  features  of  the 
previous  two  models,  namely  the  endogenous  entry  and  exit  of  firms  from  the  market,  the 
conflict between owners and creditors and tax shields. 
The most important conclusion combining the above models is that corporate decisions 
are partly influenced by the position of the company in the sector. In the model by Maksimovic 
and Zechner (1991) the position of the company refers to how much the technology used by the 
firm is similar to other companies. In the other two models, however, the industry position of a 
firm depends on whether the company is located in the main stream or on the periphery of the 
sector, as well as from its status of a company entering the market, existing in it or exiting. 
These  models  also  show  that  the  decisions  of  companies  in  the  sector  are  mutually 
interdependent, and the diversity of companies is the result of industry equilibrium (Phillips and 
MacKay, 2005).  
Studies by Phillips and MacKey (2005) based on these theoretical models confirm that 
the leverage ratio is higher and less variable in industries with a higher concentration and str  
onger mutual strategic relationships concerning debt issues. Their results also indicate that the 
capital  structure,  as  well  as  technology  and  the  risk  level  are  determined  jointly  within  an 
industry.  
Summing up the above discussion, it cannot be clearly concluded that increasing the 
rate of return on equity, and consequently the benefits for the business owners may be realized 
by optimizing the capital structure of the company by adapting it to the industrial mean of the 
leverage ratio. 
 
2.2. Size versus Capital Structure  
 
The other capital structure determinant which is the focus of this study is the firm size. The size 
of the company has become a variable used so routinely in research on corporate finance, that 
most of the articles do not pay any special attention to it, although it is often one of the most 
significant  variables  in  terms  of  capital  structure  (Kurshev  and  Strebulaev,  2008).  Many 
empirical studies confirm the strong positive correlation between the size of the company and its 
debt, which intuitively can be explained in many ways, although a theoretical justification is less 
obvious. 
Most research on capital  structure focuses on non-financial public enterprises which 
have  access  to  the  capital  market  (Myers,  2001;  Lucey  and  Mac  an  Bhaird,  2006),  while 
underestimating the SME sector (Norton, 1990; Ang 1991 and 1992; Van der Wijst and Thurik, 
1993). Earlier studies of the SMEs’ financing highlighted the differences between companies of 
different sizes (Walker and Petty, 1978), discussing whether it is justifiable to apply the theory 
constructed on the basis of large public companies to small and medium enterprises (Cosh and 
Hughes, 1994; Chittenden et al. 1996; Hughes, 1997; Berger and Udell, 1998).  
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The cross-sectional analyses clearly show that large companies in the  United States 
tend  to  have  higher  debt  ratios  than  small  firms  (Titman  and  Wessels,  1988;  Rajan  and 
Zingales,  1995;  Fama  and  French,  2002).  The  international  results  also  show  that  in  most 
countries, although not all, financial leverage generally remains in a positive relation to the size 
of an entity (Rajan and Zingales, 1995, Booth et al. 2001).  
One of the most frequently cited arguments justifying this relationship is the presence of 
additional fixed costs associated with obtaining external financing, which are smaller in the case 
of large firms, so these companies have cheaper access to external capital (Leary and Roberts, 
2005; Hennessy and Whited, 2006, Altinkilic and Hansen, 2000; Kim et al. 2003). Therefore, 
larger  companies  are  also  able  to  better  diversify  their  funding  sources.  According  to  the 
generally accepted view that it is harder for a large company to fail, and in case of problems, 
they are easier to overcome, company size is sometimes used as a proxy of the probability of 
bankruptcy (Shumway, 2001, Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The company size sometimes also 
represents the assets volatility, which is associated with the fact that small companies are often 
at the stage of early growth in emerging sectors and consequently are less predictable, i.e. 
more risky (Fama and French, 2002). 
Another  argument  refers  to  the  degree  of  asymmetry  of  information  between  the 
insiders of the company and the capital market. It is widely recognized that this problem is less 
severe for large companies due to the more detailed analysis carried out by the ever-suspicious 
investors (Kurshev and Strebulaev, 2008). It may also result from the fact that in many cases 
small businesses are closely associated with the entrepreneur who has much more information 
about the situation of the company (Jensen and Uhl, 2008). 
An attempt to explain the differences in capital structure between entities of different 
sizes was also based on the theory of agency costs (Bevan and Danbolt, 2000b). For example, 
Smith  and  Warner  (1979)  and  Michaelas  et  al.  (1999)  argue  that  the  conflicts  between 
shareholders and lenders may be particularly acute for small businesses. Lenders can reduce 
credit  risk  by  imposing  restrictions  on  the  maturity  of  loans  offered  to  small  businesses. 
Therefore,  a  smaller  share  of  long-term  debt  can  be  expected  in  small  businesses,  with 
probably a greater share of short-term debt than in large companies (Barnea et al. 1980; Whited 
1992; Stohs and Mauer, 1996).  
Unfortunately, empirical research in this area is not clear. Crutchley and Hanson (1989) 
and Rajan and Zingales (1995) confirm a significant positive correlation between company size 
and leverage – similarly to Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Michaelas et al. (1999), who show a 
positive  correlation  between  the  debt  maturity  and  the  firm  size.  However,  Remmers  et  al. 
(1974) found no evidence of the size effect, and Kester (1986) revealed a slight negative impact 
of the size on debt. In Spain, a significantly higher leverage was observed in the group of small 
and  medium  enterprises  in  comparison  to  large  firms  (Men￩ndez  Requejo,  2002).  In  turn, 
according  to  Barclay  et  al.  (1995)  the  sign  of  correlation  between  size  and  leverage  varies 
depending on the test method. 
Another explanation of the differences in financing between small and medium-sized 
companies and large ones refers to the problem that the person managing a small company 
may not have sufficient qualifications and management skills as compared to managers of large 
corporations. Therefore, it is harder for potential investors to assess whether the manager of a 
small company takes wrong decisions, potentially threatening the health of the firm. 
 The question of moral hazard also plays an important role in the availability of credit to 
SMEs. Bank lenders are mainly interested in the company’s ability to repay debt, while the firm 
may prefer a risky strategy  and potentially  higher returns. This in turn may lead to the risk 
shifting,  which  is  in  fact  a  potential  problem  with  any  debt  financing,  but  is  usually  more 
significant  in  the  case  of  SMEs  financing  as  a  result  of  the  problem  of  the  information 
asymmetry, which is more severe for small firms than for large public companies (OECD, 2006).  
The above mentioned arguments in favor of a positive relationship between the firm 
size and the debt level seem convincing and it is also likely that most of them actually work in 
practice.  However,  these  explanations  remain  largely  intuitive.  Although  one  of  the  most 
absorbing topics in the economic theory is the question of the factors determining the size of a 
company and its optimization (Coase, 1937), the existing capital structure theories are silent on  
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the impact of the size effect on the degree of external financing, especially in terms of rational 
quantitative justification for the empirically observed relationship between financial leverage and 
size of an enterprise. There are certain shortcomings in the empirical research in this area, 
relating for example to the decomposition of the size effect. Therefore some of the observed 
regularities sometimes contradict the proposed explanations. This has led the researchers to 
conclude that they do not fully understand the reasons for the correlation of the size and the 
leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
An important contribution complementing this deficiency is a relatively recent study by 
Kurshev  and  Strebulaev  (2008)  attempting  to  find  to  what  extent  the  presence  of  fixed 
transaction  costs  as  one  of  the  sources  of  the  size  effect  can  provide  a  rational  economic 
justification for the connection between debt and size. According to the authors, these types of 
costs associated with external funding lead to the less frequent capital restructuring and create 
a gap between companies of significantly different sizes. The analysis of the impact of the size 
effect on the leverage shows that if small businesses restructure their capital, they often decide 
to have a greater debt, in order to compensate in this way for the less frequent exercise of this 
kind of adjusting operations. However, longer intervals between changes in financial structure 
lead  to  lower  average  debt  ratios.  Within  one  refinancing  cycle,  the  correlation  between 
leverage and company size is reverse. Moreover, it should also be accounted for the fact that a 
number of companies decide not borrow at all. Thus, the generally positive relationship between 
leverage and size is explained by the presence of fixed costs of financing, but the relationship 
becomes negative after taking into account unleveraged companies. 
The issue of the business size and its impact on capital structure was also considered 
in the context of how national factors influence the financing of companies depending on their 
size.  A  study  on  a  sample  of  ten  European  Union  member  states  in  1993-1997  provides 
evidence for a clear distinction between large and small companies in terms of capital structure. 
In both groups financial structure is affected by the legal environment, but in different ways. 
Smaller companies – because of risk aversion on the part of lenders – have more possibilities of 
obtaining debt in a legal environment protecting borrowers. Larger companies, however, are 
more  likely  in  similar  conditions  to  use  equity.  This  is  due  to  their  bargaining  power,  which 
provides greater opportunities for the use of different funding sources, which in turn often leads 
to the decrease in the use of debt (Coeurderoy, 2002). 
Another  study  of  the  relationship  between  the  firm  size  and  the  capital  structure, 
including  also  mainly  European  countries,  reveals  that  the  specificities  of  national  financial 
systems  have  a  strong  influence  on  the  patterns  of  business  financing  in  which  there  is  a 
greater  harmonization  of  the  capital  structure  of  small  businesses  than  large  ones.  A  lower 
share  of  equity  in  SMEs  compared  to  large  companies  was  observed  in  Austria,  Germany, 
Portugal and Japan. The opposite was found in Spain and the United States. Moreover, in most 
countries the role of the short-term debt (in relation to long-term) is greater in SMEs than in 
large firms (Rivaud-Danset et al. 1998). 
The selection of ratios and data, or rather their availability, is also crucial in assessing 
the impact of size on leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that the leverage is in positive 
correlation with the firm size in all G-7 countries except Germany. If the data includes both listed 
and  unlisted  companies,  studies  often  show  an  inverse  relationship,  i.e.  the  decrease  of 
leverage with the size of firms in European countries (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1994). The size 
effect  is  also  sensitive  to  the  number  of  factors  included  in  the  econometric  study.  Tests 
performed on the data for France show that the size effect in capital structure is less clear when 
other factors are included, such as the age of the business (Bourdieu and Colin-Sedillot, 1993). 
The issue of firm size should also be considered in the light of the static trade-off theory 
of capital structure, which due to better data availability is usually verified on samples containing 
large, mostly public American companies. In this context, the question arises whether it can be 
expected  that  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  will  behave  similarly  to  large  listed 
companies  in  terms  of  optimal  capital  structure  choice.  Some  researchers  believe  that  the 
financial decisions taken by managers of SMEs can be explained on the grounds of the same 
theories that are used for large public companies, primarily the static trade-off and the pecking 
order theory (Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Considering the static trade-off theory, it is hard to deny that  
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SMEs face the same choice as large companies, i.e. a compromise between the benefits of the 
interest tax shield and bankruptcy costs. It is possible; however, that there are issues that affect 
SMEs more than large companies, or that there are problems that large companies do not have 
to deal with at all. 
One of the reasons for which the static trade-off theory might not work in the case of 
SMEs is simply the lack of managerial knowledge. If financial decisions are made in accordance 
with the static trade-off theory, it is a natural necessity for managers to be aware of the tax 
shield benefits. However, it can be supposed that in the SME sector, many companies are run 
by entrepreneurs who are not professionals in the area of finance and therefore are not able to 
fully exploit the advantages of debt (OECD, 2006). If managers are not aware of the benefits of 
leverage, their businesses may often operate at lower levels of debt.  
Financial  limits  faced  by  the  SMEs  constitute  another  interesting  factor  potentially 
differentiating the capital structure of enterprises in terms of size. As a result of such limitations 
SMEs might not be able to increase their debt levels in order to achieve the optimal capital 
structure, regardless of how well their managers know the static trade-off theory and recognize 
the benefits of debt. This suggests that these are external factors which may be responsible for 
an inadequate debt level in SMEs. From the perspective of a single firm, a slightly lower debt 
level compared to the one recommended by the theory of optimum capital structure does not 
seem to be a significant problem. However, if the lack of external financing means giving up 
profitable investments, it results in a serious development limitation. 
Finally, another reason why the capital structure of SMEs may differ from the one of 
large listed companies is the fact that bankruptcy costs incurred by SMEs are more difficult to 
bear due to the fact that a significant proportion of these firms are family businesses. Apart from 
the costs of financial distress and economic losses caused by the possible bankruptcy, family 
businesses often provide great sentimental value to their owners. It can therefore be supposed 
that the financial distress costs increase the cost of debt, which in turn will lower the optimal 
level of debt in the capital structure (Jensen and Uhl, 2008). 
Just as the static trade-off theory, the other leading theory of capital structure  – the 
pecking order theory – was also based primarily on the observations of large listed companies. 
However, both the structure of SMEs and their access to capital markets are very different from 
large corporations. For this reason, it seems interesting to verify the validity of the pecking order 
theory for this kind of businesses, as in the case of the static trade-off theory. 
In an attempt to refer the above theory to the SME sector, it is worth considering why 
these companies behave in accordance with that theory, as the reasons may be quite different 
compared to the large listed companies. It turns out that one of the arguments for the validity of 
the pecking order theory for SMEs policy on capital structure is that small businesses are often 
owned by only one owner, who also manages the company. In such case, the issue of new 
shares would weaken the position of the owner-manager and eventually could lead to the loss 
of control in the company. To avoid this, using debt instead of equity seems a natural choice 
(Lopez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008).  
Another  argument  against  the  use  of  equity  by  SMEs  is  its  cost  –  much  higher  for 
smaller firms than for listed companies. The organization of the IPO is not only costly, but – as 
research shows – the price of the shares issued is often underestimated, which is particularly 
acute for small businesses (Chittenden et al. 1996). Frank and Goyal (2008) also recognize the 
differences regarding the issue of equity capital between entities of different sizes. They argue 
that many large companies issue equity of significant value but the issues are infrequent, in 
contrast to small businesses which issue more often.  
Another  source  of  SME  financing  is  the  private  equity  funds  or  business  angels. 
However, apart from the risk of loss of control in the company as a result of their use, these 
funds are also characterized by high transaction costs due to the complexity of contracts and 
the need for negotiations (Ou and Haynes, 2006). Company size also has a significant impact 
on the availability of the debt financing. It is reflected by higher share of short-term financing in 
smaller  companies  than  in  large  firms resulting  from  the  fact  that  financial  constraints  arise 
mainly when trying to obtain long-term financing. In this context, the pecking order theory can be 
developed in relation to SMEs, by assuming that in the hierarchy of sources of financing these  
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entities prefer the short-term sources of funding over the long-term ones (Lopez-Gracia and 
Sogorb-Mira, 2008). 
 
2.3. The Relative Importance of Size and Industry in Capital Structure  
 
As for the relative importance of the two categories of factors considered in this article, i.e. size 
and industry, the study by Remmers et al. (1974) should be brought to mind, which covers 
manufacturing industry in the international cross-section. The authors claim that it is likely that 
the two determinants are wrongly considered to always significantly affect the capital structure 
of companies. Although the authors found that both factors do influence the financial structure, 
they  recognized  other  variables,  such  as  the  profitability  or  business  growth  rate  as  more 
important determinants.  
The relative importance of the industrial factors and the size was also analyzed in the 
area  of  India.  The  aim  of  the  study  by  Das  and  Roy  (2007)  was  to  empirically  verify  the 
existence  of  industrial  differences  in  the  capital  structure  between  companies  representing 
different  economic  sectors,  as  well  as  to  identify  potential  sources  of  this  variability.  The 
research method used for this purpose was, among others the analysis of variance, which led to 
the conclusion that, although the differences in size of companies to some extent contribute to 
the variability of the leverage ratio, it is the nature of the industry which is the main source of this 
variation, specifically the differences in the amount of the necessary funds resulting from the 
technology used in the industry. 
Some conclusions regarding the relative importance of the industry-specific factors and 
the firm-specific factors are also provided by MacKey and Phillips (2002) in their analysis of a 
panel  of  over  4,000  firms  from  142  industries  in  the  period  1981-2000,  which  revealed  the 
significant impact of industry factors on both the physical and financial decisions of companies. 
The study also shows that the industry effects explain much less of the variance in the financial 
structure than the firm-related factors, such as the level of risk and the technology used.  
However, different conclusions in this area are drawn by Frank and Goyal (2003) in 
their  study  including  39  factors  influencing  the  financial  leverage  of  listed  companies  in  the 
United States. The industry factor, which was measured with the use of the median leverage in 
the  sector,  was  considered  more  important  than  the  size  of  the  company  measured  by  the 
logarithm of sales revenues. Moreover, a positive relationship was found between both factors 
and the leverage. 
An important attempt to assess the importance of the size effect in the capital structure 
compared  with  the  country  effect  (and  not  the  industry  effect)  is  the  analysis  performed  by 
French  researchers  (Rivaud-Danset  et  al.  1998)  based  on  the  BACH  database.  It  included 
seven  EU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the 
United States and Japan in the seven-year study period 1990-1996. Due to the data quality, the 
analysis was limited only to the manufacturing industry broken down by industries producing 
intermediate products, investment goods, durable consumer goods and non-durable consumer 
goods. The analysis results include the conclusion about the overwhelming superiority of the 
country effect over the size effect, although the discriminatory power of size was also confirmed. 
However, there is no inference about the relative importance of the size and industry effect, 
which provides an opportunity to expand and update the empirical research to fill this gap. 
Despite so many attempts to identify the factors influencing the capital structure, there 
is  still  no  agreement  as  to  their  relative  importance  (Frank  and  Goyal,  2008).  In  the  vast 
collection of studies analyzing the relative importance of the factors considered, one can find 
empirical  examples  which  support  the  advantage  of  either  industrial  determinants  or  those 
associated with the company. There are also studies showing the lack of significance of these 
factors.  Conclusions  in  this  area  depend  not  only  on  the  analytical  area  or  population,  but 
sometimes also on the research methodology (Barclay et al. 1995).  
The above literature review indicates that it is purposeful to attempt to priorities the two 
factors  of  interest  in  the  area  of  Europe.  The  specificity  of  this  area,  exemplified  by  higher 
economic harmonization than between countries in other continents, makes that the relationship 
between the weight of size and industry in the context of capital structure is of particular interest.   
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3. Description of the Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. The Database 
 
The  source  of  the  analytical  data  is  the  BACH-ESD  (Bank  for  the  Accounts  of  Companies 
Harmonised  -  European  Sectoral  references  Database).  The  database  contains  28  financial 
ratios for non-financial incorporated European companies, which provides sectoral benchmarks 
to compare the financial performances of individual firms with their respective sectoral and size 
aggregates.  The  exploited  database  includes  ratios  for  nine  EU  countries:  Austria,  Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain.  
The ratios are shown in quartiles and in means and they are differentiated by NACE 
code (Nomenclature statistique des Activit￩s ￩conomiques dans la Communaut￩ Europ￩enne) 
and firm sizes. In this study the capital structure ratios were utilized for each country, industry 
and size group in each year of a eleven-year period 2000-2010. The data from more recent 
years were not included due to a significant number of missing items at the time of the analysis.  
The analysis involves three groups of enterprises: small companies (with a turnover of 
less than 10 million euro), medium-size companies (with a turnover between 10 million euro and 
50 million euro) and large companies (with a turnover in excess of 50 million euro) in thirteen 
industries.  The  groups  of  enterprises  according  to  their  size,  industry,  country  and  year 
constitute  the  subject  of  the  analysis.  The  object  of  the  analysis  is  the  capital  structure 
measured with the use of financial ratios described in the following section. 
The taxonomy of economic activity by NACE is two-leveled: one-letter level (sections) 
and two-digit level (divisions). This analysis involves enterprises grouped at the level of section, 
i.e. thirteen industries. Several industries were excluded from the analysis due to very limited 
data availability. Table 1 shows the industrial range of the research as well as the three-letter 
symbols attributed to each industry which are applied in the following parts of the paper. 
 
Table 1. Industrial sections by NACE  
NACE  Section  Symbol 
A  Agriculture, forestry and fishing  AGR 
B  Mining and quarrying   MIN 
C  Manufacturing   MNF 
D  Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply water   ELE 
E  Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities  WAT 
F  Construction  CST 
G  Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles   TRD 
H  Transportation and storage   TRS 
I  Accommodation and food service activities  HOT 
J  Information and communication  INF 
L  Real estate activities  RLE 
M  Professional, scientific and technical activities  PRF 
N  Administrative and support service activities  ADM 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on BACH-ESD database 
 
3.2. Capital Structure Measures 
 
Despite the abundant literature on the capital structure, the concept is still difficult to define 
unambiguously. Capital structure and the associated terms, such as financial structure, financial 
leverage,  or  gearing  are  often  understood  as  synonymous  terms,  but  they  might  also  be 
interpreted differently. The discrepancies mainly refer to the treatment of debt. 
The  literature  review  allows  distinguishing  four  basic  interpretations  of  the  capital 
structure. In the first one, relatively the broadest, capital structure can be understood as the 
proportion of equity and debt (Brealey and Myers, 1991) or as a share of individual sources of 
financing  in  the  total  capital  of  a  firm  (Hoggins,  1992;  Masulis,  1988;  Ross  et  al.  1990). 
Therefore, the capital structure can be identified as the structure of liabilities in a company, i.e. 
its financing structure (Groppelli and Nikbankht, 1999).  
 
 
J. Koralun-Bereznicka / Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, 1(2), 2013, 1-27 
 
 
 
10 
 
In a slightly narrower sense, however, the term capital structure refers only to the fixed 
capital  in  an  enterprise,  i.e.  the  relationship  of  equity  and  long-term  debt  (Weston  and 
Copeland, 1991). Capital structure is therefore defined as only the long-term debt to the equity 
(Downes and Goodman, 1991; Helfert, 1994; Moyer et al. 1992; Pike and Neale, 1993), which 
amounts to permanent financing from such funding sources as ordinary shareholders’ equity, 
preferred equity and long-term debt. In this approach, all current liabilities are eliminated from 
the scope of capital structure. 
According to the third  approach, prevailing in the  American literature (Lumby, 1994; 
Brealey and Myers, 1991), the capital structure refers to the issued securities. The concept of 
capital structure is therefore defined as the combination of different types of equity securities 
and debt issued by the company to finance its assets. A company which does not have debt in 
its financial structure is referred to as unleveraged, while the company using debt is a leveraged 
company (Song, 2005). 
The fourth approach to the capital structure includes only the shareholders’ equity and 
those components of capital, the use of which entails incurring interest expense by the company 
(Ross et al. 1990). Capital structure includes equity capital and liabilities of long- and short-term, 
but excludes interest-free liabilities. 
Despite the many differences of opinion on the part of various authors as to how to 
define the capital structure, it is most often assumed that it is a proportion of debt which a 
company  uses  to  finance  its  operations,  or  a  ratio  of  debt  to  equity.  In  the  absence  of  a 
commonly  accepted  definition  of  the  capital  structure,  there  is  also  a  multitude  of  ways  to 
measure this characteristic. The issue of multiplicity and diversity of capital structure ratios is 
further complicated by the fact that often a given ratio is known by different names, or that ratios 
of different structures bear the same name (Jerzemowska, 2006). However, regardless of the 
adopted structure and (or) the names, capital structure ratios help to assess the use of debt and 
equity in financing business assets, as well as to evaluate its ability to repay liabilities in the long 
run. 
The  measures  of  capital  structure  can  be  broadly  divided  into  two  main  groups: 
measures based on market value of equity (usually defined as the number of shares multiplied 
by market price of share on the last day of the year) and measures based on the book value of 
equity  (Lööf,  2003),  i.e.  the  book  value  ratios.  Opinions  vary  on  whether  the  market-based 
approach  is  more  appropriate  than  the  book-based  measures  of  capital  structure.  Various 
theories of capital structure, starting from the model by and F. Modigliani and M. Miller (1958) 
were often verified with the use of market values, which are sometimes regarded as the only 
appropriate values, even in the face of the need to estimate some of the amounts (Sweeney et 
al. 1997). At the same time, however, there are many publications where researchers relied 
solely  on  the  book  values  in  the  search  for  empirical  confirmation  of  theories  (Kakani  and 
Reddy, 1999; Michaelas et al. 1999; Song, 2005). 
Early empirical work tended to focus on book leverage (debt divided by total assets), 
but the more recent literature has given more attention to a market-based measure of leverage 
(debt divided by the sum of book debt and the market value of equity) (Frank and Goyal, 2008). 
The use of book values is justified by Graham and Harvey (2001), who argue that managers 
use these measures in determining the financial structure. In  addition, Barclay  et al. (2003) 
show that book values of leverage are theoretically better in the regression of leverage, as the 
denominator  of  some  market  value  ratios  may  show  false  correlation  with  some  of  the 
explanatory variables, such as the Tobin’s q ratio. Fama and French (2002), as well as Welch 
(2002)  are  some  of  the  opponents  of  using  book  values  due  to  the  reportedly  striking 
differences of the results obtained for book value and market value leverage. 
Another important  categorization  of the capital structure measures divides them into 
static and dynamic ratios (Jerzemowska, 2006). The static ratios, which show the sources of 
financing, are constructed mainly with the use of the balance sheet data (Petty et al. 1993). The 
dynamic indicators, in turn, make it possible to determine whether a company is not overly in 
debt in relation to its debt service capacity, and in addition to the balance sheet data they are 
calculated by using the information from the profit and loss account and cash flow statement.  
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Some authors believe that static ratios, based solely on the balance sheet items are of 
limited  value  in  comparison  with  the  income-based  capital  structure  ratios  (Shapiro,  1990). 
However, the widespread use of static ratios in empirical research seems to contradict this view. 
Taking into account as far as possible both of these approaches in the analysis and evaluation 
of capital structure would certainly be optimum (Gitman, 1989). In any case, the selection of 
ratios for empirical studies should result from the purpose of analysis. 
Selecting appropriate measures of capital structure is not only a theoretical problem, but 
also  has  considerable  practical  importance  with  broad  implications  for  the  quality  of  the 
conclusions drawn from the research. One of the problems with measuring capital structure is 
the sensitivity of analytical results to the changes of debt measures. As evidenced by a survey 
of  British  companies,  the  determinants  of  capital  structure  differ  significantly  depending  on 
which component of debt is considered (Bevan and Danbolt, 2000a). The differences were most 
significant  for  the  factors  of  short-term  and  long-term  debt.  In  a  study  concerning  capital 
structure choice, Titman and Wessels (1988) also consider several measures, including long-
term debt, short-term debt and convertible bonds divided by the market and book values  of 
equity respectively.  
The  above  examples  of  different  treatment  of  the  capital  structure  concept,  and 
consequently different ways of expressing it by means of ratios show another problematic issue, 
i.e.  the  lack  of  precision  in  the  definition  of  debt  that  should  be  taken  into  account  when 
measuring  leverage.  There  are  two  categories  of  liabilities  distinguished  by  the  literature: 
liabilities in the strict sense and liabilities in the broad sense. The first group includes both long- 
and short-term debt of a company. The liabilities in the broad sense, however, also include 
provisions. Therefore, the concept of provisions is certainly not synonymous with the concept of 
debt (see also: Alexander et al. 1996; Pringle and Harris, 1987; Rao, 1987; Bodie and Merton, 
2003; Peek, 2004). 
At  the  same  time,  however,  it  should  be  noted  that  if  the  forecasted  liabilities  are 
estimated correctly and an appropriate amount of provisions for this purpose is created, the 
provision is very likely to become a liability. Certainly this is not the case when provisions are 
treated  as a specific tool for embellishing financial  statements. Provisions may  be used, for 
example,  for  artificial  earnings  management,  especially  by  listed  companies,  whose 
performance is rated by the market through the prism of the profits and their steady growth. 
Despite the fact that the category of provisions differs substantially from the category of 
debt, the specific features of provisions make them essentially more similar to the liabilities, 
rather than to equity, which is reflected in the balance sheet dichotomous categorization of the 
capital  components  into  equity  and  non-equity  (debt  and  provisions).  Furthermore,  the 
probability that a particular provision becomes a liability in the future (though unspecified) is 
often  quite  high,  which  is  the  primary  reason  for  creating  that  provision.  On  the  one  hand, 
therefore, it can be argued that classifying provisions as components of debt when measuring 
capital  structure  results  in  an  unjustified  overestimation  of  debt  ratios.  On  the  other  hand, 
excluding the provisions from those ratios could lead to an artificial improvement of corporate 
financial security. 
Apart  from  the  question  of  provisions,  there  is  also  the  problem  of  selecting  the 
components  of  the  debt  itself,  which  should  be  included  in  the  capital  structure  measures. 
Taking as a starting point the model of optimal capital structure by Miller and Modigliani in its 
version with taxes, which implies that the tax savings generated by the company through the tax 
shields are one of the most important factors motivating firms to use debt, many authors support 
the view that the share of debt in the capital should only be measured by ratios including the 
interest-bearing liabilities. This applies to all liabilities, regardless of their maturity, thus both 
long-term and short-term liabilities. An argument in favor of this view is the significant difference 
in the nature of the interest-bearing liabilities and interest-free ones, such as trade credits, which 
should not be seen as capital invested in order to realize the expected rate of return (Cwynar 
and Cwynar, 2007).  
It is rather commonly accepted that the most appropriate measures of capital structure 
take into account the long-term debt and the permanent part of the short-term debt (Brealey and 
Myers, 1991). At the same time, however, there are also reasons for including the interest-free  
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liabilities when measuring capital structure. It is often argued that trade credits are one of the 
most  important  sources  of  financing  companies.  In  developing  economies  these  short-term 
liabilities are sometimes even used to finance long term investment projects (Pandey, 2010), 
which contradicts the argument to consider the capital structure in the context of the company’s 
value and its growth financed by long term capital. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that trade credit in practice is not a free source of business 
financing (Ostaszewski et al. 2009), because using it could mean the loss of price discount from 
suppliers,  which  results  in  an  increase  of  the  cost  of  sales  and  finally  a  lower  tax  base. 
Therefore, the economic consequences of using the trade credit by a company are similar to the 
effect of the use of interest-bearing external sources of financing, such as a bank loan. 
The proponents of a broader definition of capital structure, which includes interest-free 
liabilities, focus on the problem of business risk, the level of which is affected not only by long-
term  debt,  but  also  by  current  and  non-interest  bearing  liabilities  (Huang  and  Song,  2006). 
Another justification of taking into account these liabilities when measuring capital structure is 
the  obvious  influence  of  the  current  liabilities  on  the  company’s  liquidity  –  one  of  the  main 
criteria considered by potential lenders (Gibson, 2001). 
Currently, some authors argue that the inference about the capital structure based on 
empirical observations may be distorted due to the fact that the standard measures of financial 
leverage do  not  include lease liabilities (Leary and  Graham, 2011). As a result, a company 
which has a larger share of such liabilities seems to be less indebted (Welch, 2011). Therefore, 
in the recent literature there are recommendations for considering the capitalized value of lease 
payments in the nominator of the leverage ratio (Rampini and Viswanathan, 2010, Rauh and 
Sufi, 2010), the more so that their role is increasing and leasing often replaces traditional debt 
(Cornaggia et al. 2009).  
To summarize the above discussion about the problems of measuring capital structure, 
it should be said that when selecting and constructing debt ratios, two main issues need to be 
resolved: 
 
–  which  values  –  market  or  book  values  –  should  provide  a  basis  for  estimating  the 
proportion of equity and debt; 
–  which capital components, particularly  in relation to  debt, should be included  as the 
appropriate measures of capital structure (Cwynar and Cwynar, 2007). 
 
Unfortunately, the literature review does not provide clear guidance in this area. The 
choice of the most adequate capital structure measure should therefore depend on the purpose 
of analysis, but the effects of corporate financial decisions are probably best represented by the 
relationship of total debt to total capital, defined as the sum of equity and total debt (Rajan and 
Zingales,  1995).  Whenever  conducting  analyses,  the  results  should  be  interpreted  with  the 
awareness of the difficulty in measuring both leverage and the explanatory variables (Harris and 
Raviv, 1991).  
Considering the above discussion, a detailed examination of all forms of corporate debt 
is desirable in order to perform a complete capital structure analysis. Bearing this in mind, the 
following  analysis  includes  not  just  the  most  commonly  recommended  ratio  of  debt  to  total 
assets, but also a number of more detailed ratios of the liabilities structure. This is supposed to 
provide a more comprehensive view at corporate financing strategies. However, due to the fact 
that  the  companies  in  the  analyzed  sample  are  non-public  firms,  the  use  of  market-based 
measures of leverage is excluded. All of the ratios employed rely on book values solely. In fact, 
the choice of ratios is largely determined by the data availability. The study takes into account 
all of the liabilities structure ratios provided by the BACH-ESD database. The list of ratios used 
in this empirical research is shown in table 2.  
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Table 2. Capital structure ratios used in the analysis 
Liability item  Symbol  Ratio number in BACH-ESD 
Total debt  D/A  1–R22 
Provisions  P/A  R23 
Credits  C/A  R24 
Long-term credits  LC/A  R25 
Short-term credits  SC/A  R26 
Long-term liabilities  LL/A  R27 
Short-term liabilities  SL/A  R28 
          Source: Author’s own compilation based on BACH-ESD database 
 
The variables are ratios of means and not means of ratios, as the data available is 
aggregated. This means that the ratios are calculated with the use of the balance sheet data 
averaged  for  all  companies  in  a  given  category  of  size,  country  and  industry.  They  are  not 
means of ratios, which would indicate that ratios are first calculated at the firm level (unavailable 
in BACH-ESD database) and then the ratios are averaged for the whole category of firms. 
 
3.3. Methodology 
 
The choice of the research methodology can be justified – as mentioned – by the nature of the 
data,  which  is  a  relatively  large  set  of  objects  (industries,  size  groups  and  size  groups  in 
industries) described by a number of diagnostic variables. The scope of research, both due to 
the abundance of the data and its multidimensionality, to some extent determines the type of 
analytical tools employed in the study, i.e. mainly the taxonomic methods. 
Multivariate analysis methods are a natural tool for simplifying the structure of the data 
and  identifying  the  most  important  regularities.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the 
application of taxonomic methods is the only possible approach in this case. The review of the 
hitherto  studies,  however,  shows  that  the  multivariate  statistical  analysis  often  provides  an 
effective solution to similar research problems (Cinca et al.2005; Gupta and Huefner, 1972; Leal 
and Powers, 1997; Sell, 2005; Helg et al. 1995; Boillat et al. 2002). 
The initial stage of the analysis was meant to verify whether the observed differences in 
means of capital structure ratios between industries and size groups are statistically significant. 
For  this  purpose,  the  one-way  analysis  of  variance  ANOVA  was  used  as  a  method  to  test 
observations, which depend on one or more simultaneous factors. These factors are also known 
as  grouping  or  classifying  factors,  or  manipulative  variables.  The  analysis  of  variance, 
developed in the twenties by Fisher (1954), allows evaluating the significance of differences 
between many means and explains the probability with which the extracted factors may be the 
reason for the observed differences between group means. The hypotheses then are as follows: 
t
j i
H        ... : 2
,
1 0 , against the alternative hypothesis
j
j i
i H    
,
:
1 ,  j i  .  If  the  means 
differ significantly, it can be intuitively concluded that the analyzed factors affect the dependent 
variable. The essence of the analysis of va riance is thus the simultaneous examination of the 
significance  of  differences  between  means  from  multiple  groups  (populations).  The  use  of 
ANOVA  method  involves  the fulfillment  of  assumptions  about  the  measurability  of  the 
dependent  variables,  the  normali ty  of  their  distribution:  ) , ( i i N   ,  i  =  1,  2,  ...,  k,  and  the 
homogeneity  of  variance: 
2 2 2 ...
2 1 t       .  However,  meeting  the  assumption  of  normality 
usually is not indispensable, as the significance tests remain valid. Many empirical  examples 
show  that  the  deviations  from  normality  have  little  effect  on  the  results  of  the  analysis  of 
variance. In practice, therefore, even significant deviations do not cause large inference errors 
(Domański,  1990).  Similarly,  it  can  be  assumed  that  some  deviations  from  variance 
homogeneity are also permissible. 
The  heterogeneity  of  the  elements  of  the  analyzed  population,  as  well  as  certain 
similarities detected between them, create a natural need to organize the objects, i.e. to classify 
them.  The  concept  of  classification  can  be  interpreted  as  grouping  objects  into  sets  or 
categories based on their properties. This grouping process is the next stage of analysis. One of  
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the many grouping methods, which make it possible to distinguish the internally coherent groups 
of objects is the cluster analysis (Hartigan, 1975). It aims at classifying the observed data by 
placing  similar  objects  represented  by  vectors  into  certain  groups.  The  higher  the  level  of 
aggregation gets, the less similar the objects from different classes of the organized structure 
become. Classification scheme makes it possible to identify the hidden causes of the formation 
of different categories, as well as to find the characteristic features common for the objects from 
the same group (Leal and Powers, 1997). 
The  clusters  can  be  created  if  an  appropriate  measure  of  similarity  or  dissimilarity 
between  objects  is  defined.  The  algorithm  of  the  agglomeration  method  used  in  this  case 
groups the objects according to the square Euclidean distance: 
2
) , ( ) ( i i i y x y x d   
. In order to 
determine  the  distances  between  new  clusters  formed  by  the  linked  objects,  i.e.  the 
amalgamation  procedure,  which  determines  the  degree  of  similarity  of  these  clusters,  the 
hierarchical Ward’s method was chosen:  2 )) , ( ( ) , ( y x d
k m
k m
Y X D 


 , where m, k – numbers of 
objects in clusters X and Y  (Ward, 1963). It is distinguished by the fact that it uses methods 
characteristic of the analysis of variance in order to estimate the distances between clusters 
(Milligan,  1996)  and  that  it  tends  to  form  less  numerous  clusters  (Boillat  et  al.  2002).  The 
method aims at minimizing the sum of squares of any two (hypothetical) clusters that can be 
formed at each stage of the amalgamation. The effectiveness of the Ward’s method in detecting 
data structure is better in comparison with other methods, although it tends to create clusters of 
small  size  (Ward,  1963).  Applying  Ward’s  method  determined  the  use  of  square  Euclidean 
distance as the metric defining the distance between objects.  
 
4. Results 
 
The cross-industry discriminating abilities of the capital structure ratios can be  evaluated by 
analyzing the values of the F-statistic calculated  for both the entire data set,  as well  as for 
individual countries and size groups of enterprises. The results in Table 3 show that all the 
considered capital structure ratios have good discriminating abilities in terms of cross-industry 
section, both for the entire population, as well as in individual countries and size groups.  
Considering the firm size, the evaluation of the discriminating power of the variables can 
be based on the ANOVA results presented in Table 4, which show that the company size is a 
much worse qualitative predictor than the industry. In a significant number of cases there is no 
reason to reject the hypothesis of equal means in individual size groups. This is particularly 
noticeable in case of the primary capital structure ratio, i.e. the total debt to assets. For the 
aggregated data, i.e. for the whole population, the ratio is not significantly different between size 
groups. This is also the case in four countries and six industries. The country, where the size 
proved to be the least important in terms of capital structure was Poland, where only the ratio of 
provisions is significantly different between firms of different sizes. It is worth noting here, that 
small businesses have a much lower level of provisions than the large ones, which is also the 
case in other countries and industries where the size does play an important role in relation to 
the provisions ratio. The industries where the capital structure is highly dependent on the firm 
size are the sectors of manufacturing, transport and accommodation. 
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Table 3. One-way analysis of variance across industries: values of F-statistics and p; 
p = 0.05 
Country, 
size  Content 
Variables 
D/A  P/A  C/A  LC/A  SC/A  LL/A  SL/A 
AT  F  11.09  8.61  12.39  11.65  6.45  18.91  18.28 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
BE  F  24.21  33.37  31.41  42.62  15.51  42.84  32.90 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
DE  F  40.17  30.45  86.83  200.00  17.46  153.43  176.49 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
ES  F  19.06  15.96  20.71  29.80  18.32  27.44  66.89 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
FR  F  72.56  64.50  42.63  48.52  44.47  96.93  134.77 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
IT  F  48.74  30.56  29.29  45.43  26.13  19.00  52.90 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NL  F  5.86  9.90  .  .  .  23.86  12.56 
p  0.000  0.000        0.000  0.000 
PL  F  40.29  16.33  16.08  22.59  14.27  21.29  109.06 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PT  F  20.68  22.20  25.05  27.94  17.94  30.73  39.24 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
S  F  20.09  9.54  37.43  67.76  15.15  71.85  78.64 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
M  F  19.87  11.96  35.54  72.52  24.39  56.75  88.76 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
L  F  20.99  18.56  24.77  27.35  21.40  27.35  59.37 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Total 
F  47.42  31.80  69.80  116.45  45.00  106.83  190.23 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on BACH-ESD database 
Notes: The grouping factor is the industry; “.” indicates missing data. 
 
The  results  of  the  one-way  ANOVA  performed  for  the  two  cross-sections,  i.e.  for 
industries and size groups, provide initial indication about the dominance of the industry effect in 
the  examined  population.  The  further  confirmation  of  this  conclusion  can  be  found  in  the 
following part of the research, where the cluster analysis is applied. 
One  of  the  dimensions  of  the  analyzed  input  data  is  time.  Therefore,  the  ANOVA 
procedure was also carried out across years. The results of the analysis of variance in time are 
important  for  the  methodology  of  further  research,  because  significant  differences  between 
individual  sub-periods  would  mean  that  it  is  purposeful  to  conduct  the  cluster  analysis 
separately  for  each  year.  If,  however,  the  analysis  of  variance  across  time  does  not  show 
significant differences of the diagnostic variables, the time-means of ratios could be recognized 
as representatives of typical leverage characteristics within the analyzed period. The results of 
this analysis – as not directly related to the main theme of the research  – are presented in 
Annex 1. 
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Table 4. One-way analysis of variance across size groups: values of F-statistics and p; 
p = 0.05 
Country. 
industry  Content  Variables 
D/A  P/A  C/A  LC/A  SC/A  LL/A  SL/A 
AT  F  16.59  37.04  56.55  47.58  34.36  13.96  5.27 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.006 
BE  F  6.32  27.67  16.34  16.99  0.43  1.62  3.58 
p  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.648  0.200  0.029 
DE  F  10.35  49.16  42.51  12.25  121.62  6.83  11.05 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000 
ES  F  32.07  64.83  16.46  9.35  12.38  6.10  3.68 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.026 
FR  F  2.15  20.92  49.73  39.41  11.35  9.75  1.42 
p  0.118  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.244 
IT  F  2.25  13.85  43.47  15.14  25.76  6.21  5.83 
p  0.107  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.003 
NL  F  8.78  39.63  .  .  .  3.14  3.45 
p  0.000  0.000        0.045  0.033 
PL  F  1.15  21.53  0.51  0.96  0.16  2.68  1.86 
p  0.319  0.000  0.601  0.384  0.849  0.071  0.158 
PT  F  1.09  20.95  9.13  2.58  11.74  0.04  3.80 
p  0.336  0.000  0.000  0.077  0.000  0.964  0.023 
AGR  F  9.88  1.25  12.42  58.48  0.58  49.06  3.75 
p  0.000  0.289  0.000  0.000  0.563  0.000  0.025 
MIN  F  1.49  25.82  21.88  12.07  23.60  3.97  6.86 
p  0.228  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.020  0.001 
MNF  F  12.68  8.08  86.96  85.15  45.76  15.32  17.65 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
ELE  F  0.13  27.29  83.22  72.99  17.24  10.70  0.84 
p  0.882  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.433 
WAT  F  0.26  26.21  0.87  2.09  0.84  1.52  10.06 
p  0.768  0.000  0.421  0.127  0.435  0.220  0.000 
CST  F  0.84  4.53  28.28  28.30  14.61  20.08  3.93 
p  0.434  0.012  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.021 
TRD  F  1.98  1.93  51.65  108.47  18.55  29.56  0.79 
p  0.140  0.147  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.454 
TRS  F  8.81  30.60  17.96  6.24  40.41  3.48  53.92 
p  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.032  0.000 
HOT  F  16.05  3.63  73.48  86.18  6.28  44.29  7.62 
p  0.000  0.028  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.001 
INF  F  1.00  7.83  9.60  8.04  21.22  51.80  50.74 
p  0.371  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
RLE  F  5.00  16.11  0.29  0.84  4.18  2.16  3.21 
p  0.008  0.000  0.745  0.433  0.017  0.119  0.043 
PRF  F  4.45  1.96  1.14  0.94  9.82  0.74  1.11 
p  0.013  0.144  0.321  0.391  0.000  0.479  0.330 
ADM  F  18.16  2.10  0.76  2.90  0.93  7.84  2.06 
p  0.000  0.124  0.467  0.057  0.396  0.000  0.130 
Total  F  2.61  102.19  155.90  95.55  87.40  18.14  2.94 
p  0.074  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.053 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on BACH-ESD database 
Notes: The grouping factor is the firm size; “.” indicates missing data, deficiencies of statistical significance 
are shaded. 
 
The results show that within the examined population the time factor plays the least 
important  role  in  comparison  with  the  other  two  qualitative  predictors,  i.e.  the  industry  and 
company size. Although for the total population, i.e. for all countries, industries and sizes, four of 
the seven analyzed capital structure ratios do show significant differences in time, considering 
the significance of the time factor separately for individual countries, industries and size groups 
indicates  that  the  significant  variation  over  time  is  an  exception  rather  than  a  rule.  Similar  
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persistence in leverage ratios at the firm level is also reported by Lemmon et al. (2007), who 
show that firms tend to keep leverage stationary. Therefore, the following cluster analysis is 
performed with the use of the time means of ratios for the whole eleven-year period. 
However, with reference to the ratios which do show some significant variance across 
time, it would also be useful to see how the capital structure evolved within the study period. 
This might be particularly  interesting in the context  of the financial crisis,  which occurred in 
Europe in 2009. The most recent data available partly covers the post-crisis period, i.e. the year 
2010. It could be expected, that the financial crisis should leave its mark on corporate financing 
strategies. However, the graph of the expected means of the basic debt to assets ratio (Figure 
1) does not reveal any noticeable changes during this time of economic turbulence.  
 
   
 
Figure 1. Expected means of the debt to assets ratio (D/A) and credits to assets ratio 
(C/A); average for all countries, industries and size groups. Vertical bars indicate 0.95 
confidence limits. 
 
Apart from the systematic decrease of leverage during the whole period, the significant 
variance in time of the debt ratio results from the two clearly separable leverage levels. The first 
sub-period, covering the years 2000-2004, is characterized with considerably higher average 
debt  ratios  (exceeding  66%).  Lower  debt  ratios  (below  64%  on  average)  follow  the  drop 
observed in 2005. The shift towards less risky financing policies results mainly from the lower 
use of short-term financing by companies. However, as shown in the second part of the Figure 
1, the use of credits surged in the three most recent years of the analytical period. This increase 
can be attributed to the more favorable conditions of obtaining credits during this period, as a 
result of crisis in the financial sector.    
The graphical creation of clusters (agglomerations) can be presented in the form of a 
dendrogram. The result of applying the agglomerative algorithm for size groups in industries 
based on average selected ratios for all countries in the whole research period is a hierarchical 
tree, shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Tree diagram based on average capital structure ratios from 2000-2010 for nine 
countries; Ward method, square Euclidean distance 
 
If the branches of the tree diagram are cut where the linkage distance is about 0.1, the 
analyzed population can be divided into four clearly separated clusters, which seems the most 
natural grouping. All of the identified clusters are composed of all size groups, although not 
exactly proportionally. However, in each of the clusters, there are usually easily distinguishable 
industry items which prevail. The first cluster (from the bottom of the graph) is dominated by 
three industries: mining, information and communication as well as professional activities, from 
which all three size groups of firms are present. The second cluster is clearly dominated by 
trade, construction and administration. The sectors of real estate and accommodation are the 
prevailing elements of the third cluster, whereas the last one can be identified as a water supply 
and transport cluster. 
The grouping results suggest that the industry-specificity is the dominating factor over 
the size-specificity within the examined population. However, it should be borne in mind that the 
discussed  results  are  based  on  the  average  capital  structure  ratios  for  the  total  of  nine 
countries. Considering the likely differences between countries, it is purposeful to perform the 
cluster analysis for each country separately.  
The  tree  diagrams  for  individual  countries  are  not  reported  here,  but  the  synthetic 
summary  of  the  results  is  presented  in  Table  5.  Each  field  in  the  table  shows  the  main 
dominating element(s) in the cluster for a given country, thus informing about the nature of the 
cluster. The number of extracted clusters is similar in each case, ranging from 6 to 8, which is 
meant to make the cross-country comparisons easier. As in the case of the cluster analysis 
performed  for  the  total  of  nine  countries,  the  identification  of  the  nature  of  clusters  in  each 
country was based on the number of the dominating items, either in terms of size or industry. In 
several  cases,  however,  it  was  impossible  to  determine  the  character  of  a  cluster,  either 
because it was a one-item cluster or because none of the features (size and industry) prevailed.  
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Table 5. Summary of the cluster analysis results for individual countries 
Cluster 
Country 
AT  BE  DE  ES  FR  IT  NL  PL  PT  All 
1  3  WAT  RLE  HOT 
ELE  CST  HOT  TRD 
PRF 
single 
item 
ADM 
CST 
MIN 
INF 
PRF 
2  3  ELE  WAT 
ELE  3 
MNF 
TRD 
INF 
ELE 
WAT 
1. 2 
1  HOT 
WAT 
HOT 
2. 3 
CST 
TRD 
ADM 
3  RLE  PRF  single 
item 
RLE 
TRS  PRF  TRS  CST 
INF 
TRS 
2. 3 
ELE 
TRS 
RLE 
RLE 
HOT 
4  2. 3  3  3  2  single 
item 
INF 
ADM 
1. 2 
3  TRD  3  WAT 
TRS 
5  1  MNF 
TRS 
TRD 
CST 
CST 
ADM 
AGR 
MIN  3  3  1  2 
 
6  AGR  2  1  MNF 
1  RLE  TRD 
CST  1  single 
item 
TRD 
MNF 
7  single 
item 
single 
item 
   
TRS 
ADM 
1. 2 
AGR 
MNF 
 
RLE 
ELE 
 
8  1  HOT 
ADM     
AGR 
MIN 
ELE 
3 
Legend: 
Industry-dominated cluster  Size-dominated cluster  Cluster of unidentified nature 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on BACH-ESD database 
Notes: Each field in the table shows the main dominating element(s) in the cluster for a given country, 
thus informing about the nature of the cluster. The number of completed fields for each country indicates 
the number of identified clusters. 
 
It is obvious from the above summary table that in most countries it is the industry effect 
which  dominates  over  the  size  effect.  Most  clusters  in  most  countries  are  industry-oriented. 
However, the importance of firm size should not be underestimated, as in all countries there is 
at least one cluster which is size-oriented. The inverse proportion is only the case in Austria and 
the Netherlands, where most clusters seem to be affected by the factor of size. The several 
clusters of an unidentified nature (not including the single-item ones) also prove the existence of 
some size-specificity.  
The  sector  which  seems  to  have  the  strongest  industry-specific  features  is  the  real 
estate sector, which in some cases creates a cluster of all-size firms unaccompanied by other 
industries. The sectors of construction and trade also demonstrate clear industrial specificity. 
Moreover, the two items often remain in one cluster, which proves their great mutual similarity. 
As for the size, the large enterprises are the most distinct from other sizes, as evidenced by the 
fact that most of the size-dominated clusters include mainly large firms. The specificity of small 
firms is also noticeable. However, the medium-sized companies are the  least  characteristic, 
which can be explained by the fact that their financing strategies are probably a compromise 
between the capital structure of small and large companies.  
Obviously,  one  has  to  be  aware  of  the  inevitable  context-specificity  of  the  research 
findings.  As  shown  by  the  analysis,  the  industrial  specificity  is  not  homogeneous  across  all 
industries and may be more apparent in some sectors than in others. For the firms belonging to 
these  specific  industries,  like  for  example  the  real  estate  sector,  trade  or  construction,  the 
industrial classification may  be of particular importance in terms of capital structure. On the 
contrary, for firms from less outstanding industries, other factors, including firm size, may be 
relatively  more  important.  The  results  contribute  to  the  knowledge  of  capital  structure  by 
revealing the complexity of the interaction between individual factors with reference to private 
companies. Therefore, the prevalence of one factor over another in some countries, industries  
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or size groups does not allow us to assume the same priority in other circumstances. Moreover, 
as noticed previously by Beckers et al. (1996), it can be expected that the results concerning the 
relative importance of factors depend on the industrial classification  – the more detailed the 
industrial breakdown, the more specific the corporate financing and, consequently, the higher 
the relevance of industry factors.  
The  above-mentioned  complexity  of  the  capital  structure  determinants  is  even  more 
difficult to explore due to the very high number of factors potentially responsible for corporate 
financing  strategies.  This  study  was  purposefully  limited  to  only  two  of  them,  which,  to  the 
author’s knowledge, are less exploited in the hitherto literature, contrary, for example, to the 
country characteristics, which have been also widely reported as significantly impacting capital 
structure  (La  Porta  et  al.  1997;  Demirgü￧-Kunt  and  Maksimovic,  1999;  Booth  et  al.  2001; 
Claessens  et  al.  2001;  Bancel  and  Mittoo,  2004;  Rajan  and  Zingales,  1995;  Brounen  et  al. 
2006).  These  country-specific  determinants,  which  include  such  factors,  as  corporate 
governance, stock market characteristics, and institutional or legal environment, are bound to 
explain a considerable portion of cross-country capital structure heterogeneity.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The aim of the above empirical research was to compare the relative importance of the industry-
specific factors with the size-specific factors in their impact on the corporate capital structure of 
the 9 EU countries. The most general conclusion which can be drawn from the analysis is the 
dominating role of the industry effect over the size effect, which means that leverage ratios 
depend more on the industry, in which a company operates, rather than on the firm size. First, 
this is evidenced by the one-way analysis of variance conducted for the two sections, i.e. across 
industries and across size groups, which shows that all the capital structure ratios included in 
the study, differ significantly across industries, but have considerably lower discriminating power 
in  terms  of firm  size.  Second,  the  prevalence  of  the  industry-specificity  is  confirmed  by  the 
cluster analysis performed on the industries in size groups, which reveals that the majority of 
clusters  are  industry-dominated.  This  conclusion  is  generally  consistent  with  the  earlier 
mentioned previous studies aiming to compare these two factors in other regions, namely the 
United States or India. 
This regularity concerning the relative importance of the industry and size effect refers 
not only to the total population of all countries, but also to most of them considered separately. 
The only exceptions in this fairly homogenously industry-affected population of the EU countries 
are Austria and the Netherlands, where the firm size is of considerably higher significance in 
terms  of  capital  structure  than  in  other  countries.  The  reasons  for  the  differentiation  in  the 
relative importance of industry and size between countries should be searched in the country 
specificity, which apparently may affect the way capital structure determinants impact corporate 
leverage ratios. Thus, the national specificity is not only a capital structure determinant as such, 
as widely evidenced by the literature. Other leverage determinants, such as for example size, 
might affect the capital structure differently, depending on the country. This proves that despite 
the abundance of studies on the factors affecting capital structure, this area of corporate finance 
requires further research. 
The prevalence of the industry effect over the size effect in the  analyzed population 
implies that the cross-industry  diversification of investments should prove more beneficial in 
comparison  with  the  cross-size  diversification.  It  should  however  be  borne  in  mind  that  this 
recommendation results from the research based on the book values of non-public companies, 
which does not mean that they can be extrapolated on listed companies. In the case of the 
latter, the effects of portfolio diversification are obtained by the correlation of market returns and 
not by measuring capital structure with the use of book-based ratios. 
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Annex 1. One-way analysis of variance across time: Values of F-statistics and p; p = 0.05  
Country. 
industry. 
size 
Content 
Variables 
D/A  P/A  C/A  LC/A  SC/A  LL/A  SL/A 
AT  F  0.978  0.721  1.548  1.005  1.803  0.357  1.035 
p  0.462  0.705  0.123  0.440  0.059  0.964  0.413 
BE  F  1.734  0.026  0.096  0.097  1.512  0.140  2.544 
p  0.071  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.133  0.999  0.006 
DE  F  3.117  0.245  0.743  0.220  2.794  0.327  0.169 
p  0.001  0.991  0.684  0.994  0.002  0.974  0.998 
ES  F  0.371  0.733  0.755  2.326  1.147  3.029  1.310 
p  0.959  0.694  0.672  0.011  0.326  0.001  0.222 
FR  F  1.474  0.338  0.334  0.504  5.457  0.429  1.063 
p  0.146  0.970  0.972  0.887  0.000  0.933  0.390 
IT  F  1.215  0.337  0.626  1.530  0.584  1.142  1.045 
p  0.279  0.971  0.791  0.126  0.828  0.329  0.405 
NL  F  2.571  3.208  .  .  .  0.359  1.527 
p  0.007  0.001        0.954  0.137 
PL  F  0.280  0.033  0.403  0.276  0.254  0.390  0.051 
p  0.924  0.999  0.807  0.926  0.907  0.856  0.998 
PT  F  0.217  0.752  0.756  0.481  2.873  0.817  0.238 
p  0.995  0.675  0.671  0.902  0.002  0.613  0.992 
AGR  F  0.574  0.478  1.394  0.519  0.484  0.375  0.824 
p  0.834  0.903  0.188  0.875  0.899  0.956  0.606 
MIN  F  0.729  0.239  0.636  0.578  0.306  0.623  0.620 
p  0.697  0.992  0.782  0.831  0.979  0.793  0.796 
MNF  F  1.865  0.183  0.404  0.676  0.695  0.684  2.172 
p  0.050  0.997  0.944  0.746  0.729  0.739  0.020 
ELE  F  0.483  0.810  1.536  1.171  0.504  0.716  0.287 
p  0.900  0.620  0.128  0.311  0.886  0.710  0.984 
WAT  F  0.522  0.066  0.340  0.668  0.713  0.620  0.885 
p  0.874  1.000  0.969  0.754  0.711  0.796  0.548 
CST  F  2.029  0.226  0.159  0.206  0.659  0.346  2.900 
p  0.031  0.994  0.999  0.996  0.762  0.967  0.002 
TRD  F  5.146  0.280  0.740  0.609  1.089  0.305  3.643 
p  0.000  0.985  0.687  0.806  0.371  0.980  0.000 
TRS  F  0.642  0.430  0.459  0.226  0.612  0.174  0.378 
p  0.777  0.931  0.915  0.994  0.803  0.998  0.955 
HOT  F  1.283  0.155  0.215  0.269  0.708  0.262  1.256 
p  0.241  0.999  0.995  0.987  0.716  0.988  0.256 
INF  F  2.475  0.862  0.702  0.644  1.752  0.284  1.226 
p  0.008  0.570  0.722  0.775  0.070  0.984  0.274 
RLE  F  0.555  0.213  0.427  0.119  0.849  0.240  0.566 
p  0.849  0.995  0.932  1.000  0.582  0.992  0.840 
PRF  F  1.025  0.040  0.964  0.295  1.982  0.525  1.104 
p  0.423  1.000  0.476  0.982  0.037  0.872  0.359 
ADM  F  2.820  0.459  0.889  0.071  1.964  0.120  2.605 
p  0.003  0.915  0.544  1.000  0.039  1.000  0.005 
S  F  4.730  0.979  2.290  1.368  2.761  0.614  3.977 
p  0.000  0.459  0.012  0.190  0.002  0.803  0.000 
M  F  2.389  0.675  0.926  0.700  2.092  0.725  2.762 
p  0.008  0.749  0.509  0.725  0.023  0.702  0.002 
L  F  3.615  0.830  0.540  0.192  1.323  0.511  1.771 
p  0.000  0.599  0.863  0.997  0.213  0.883  0.062 
Total  F  10.059  1.486  2.796  1.620  5.202  1.270  7.812 
p  0.000  0.138  0.002  0.095  0.000  0.242  0.000 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on BACH-ESD database 
Notes: The grouping factor is the year; “. ” indicates missing data. Significant differentiation is highlighted. 
 
 